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Abstract 
The present study addresses antecedents and consequences of collective vic-
timhood in the context of World War I (WWI) across 15 European nations (N 
= 2423 social science students). Using multilevel analysis, we find evidence 
that collective victimhood is still present a hundred years after the onset of the 
war and can be predicted by WWI-related objective indicators of victimization 
at national and family levels. This suggests that collective vic- timhood is 
partly grounded in the actual experience of WWI. In addition, we show that 
sense of collective victimhood positively predicts acknowledgment of the 
suffering inflicted by one's nation on other countries during WWI. This is 
consistent with a social representation of WWI as involving a vast massacre in 
which nations were both victim and perpetrator. Finally, we find that objective 
indicators of victimization predict pacifism in divergent ways, with an 
indicator at the national level associated with more pacifist attitudes and an 
indicator at the family level being associated with less pacifist attitudes. This 
finding suggests that war-torn societies may have developed social represen-
tations favouring peaceful coexistence whereas, at the family level, victimiza-
tion may still foster retaliatory tendencies. 
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A century of victimhood P. Bouchat etal. 
"This war, like the next war, is a war to end war” 
David Lloyd George (cited by Lucas, 1932, p. 296) 
Self-perceived collective victimhood can be defined 
as "a mindset shared by group members that results from 
a perceived intentional harm with severe and lasting 
consequences inflicted on a collective by another group 
or groups, a harm that is viewed as undeserved, unjust 
and immoral and one that the group was not able to 
prevent" (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 
2009, p. 238). Vollhardt (2012) further notes that 
"ingroup identification can result in an intense percep-
tion of collective victimhood even if the harm has not 
been experienced personally, but only by other members 
of one's group;and even when the victimization did not 
occur in a person's lifetime, but centuries ago" 
(p. 2). 
Social psychologists have been primarily preoccupied 
with the question of how this sense of collective victim- 
hood can influence group members' current social iden-
tity and their attitudes and behaviours towards relevant 
out-groups (e.g., Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Noor, 
Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Rime, Bouchat, Klein, 
& Licata, 2015). In keeping with a Lewinian 
perspective, the question of whether this sense of 
victimhood maps onto objective facts has not been 
considered of primary interest. Social psychologists do 
not deny the reality of the events that initiated this sense 
of victimhood, but it is the phenomenology of 
victimhood that has preoccupied the field: The interest 
of social psychologists has delved on subjective 
experience of shared victimhood rather than on 
"objective" victimization, which is the province of 
historians. 
More generally, in appraising victimhood, social psy-
chologists have considered that group members may 
sometimes greatly suffer without an inevitable sense of 
collective victimhood whereas other, possibly less se-
vere, harms may lead to a strong sense of victimhood. 
This is because some victimizing events may be more 
easily articulated in narratives depicting the group's his-
tory than others (Hammack, 2009; Laszlo, 2013). To 
take an example, the notion that, during the First World 
War, (Belgian) Flemish soldiers died in "Flanders' 
fields" because they did not understand the orders of 
their French speaking superiors has featured promi-
nently in collective memory because it fits the national-
ist agenda of the Flemish movement (see Klein, Licata, 
Van der Linden, Mercy, & Luminet, 2012), which aimed 
at more autonomy from the (then) French speaking elite. 
Yet, the role this factor played in Flemish fatalities 
during the First World War has not been substantiated 
historically and, compared to other countries, Belgium 
experienced very few military fatalities in World War I 
(De Vos & Keymeulen, 1989). According to such a phe-
nomenological perspective, there may actually be little 
relation between the "objective" indicators of victimiza-
tion (e.g., number of fatalities) associated with the his-
tory of a specific group and "subjective" victimization 
given that the narratives that shape collective memory 
can easily distort reality (e.g., Baumeister & Hastings, 
1997). This does not mean that such social representa-
tions are independent of reality but that the connection 
between victimhood and social reality may be largely 
indirect or metaphorical (e.g., the iconic Flemish soldier 
as representative of the oppressed Flemish people, cf. 
Assman & Conrad, 2010). 
Using this perspective as a point of departure, our first 
goal in this paper is specifically to test whether there is a 
correspondence between objective indicators of past 
victimization across individuals and groups and subjec-
tive experiences of victimhood. Appraising the role of 
objective victimization in collective victimhood is often 
an intricate matter given that one tends to focus on a 
single case or socio-historical context of victimization 
(e.g., the Holocaust for Jews or the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict). A limitation of such an approach is that it only 
affords to investigate intragroup variations in victim-
hood. Yet, if victimization is a socially constructed expe-
rience (i.e., embedded in social representations, cf. 
Elcheroth, 2006), appraising the experience of several 
distinct groups is necessary. 
Victimization in World War I 
World War I, the historical context considered in this 
article, constitutes an ideal setting for appraising this 
question. A cross-cultural survey conducted in 24 socie-
ties (Liu et al., 2005, see also Hilton & Liu, 2008) 
showed that World War I (WWI) was nominated across 
the globe as the second most important event in World 
History, after World War II (WWII;see also Bobowik et 
al., 2014). While its scale was global, this conflict has 
particularly affected the European continent. WWI broke 
out in June 1914 and the most important battles took 
place in Europe. In November 1918, at the end of the 
war, the Old Continent was devastated. To appraise its 
impact, consider that 50% of the adult male population 
of the nations involved in the war enrolled in an army 
and that of these, half were killed, wounded or made 
prisoners (Winter, 2004). The toll of the war included 
vast destructions and political instability in addition to 
the millions of dead and wounded. This led a range of 
specialists (e.g., Morin, 1987) to characterize the First 
World War as a "Suicide of Europe". 
Yet, the countries involved in this conflict have expe-
rienced varying levels of damage and fatalities. Are 
group members sensitive to these differences? Do the 
most afflicted countries perceive themselves as having 
been more victimized during WWI than those that were 
less affected? Answering these questions allows us to 
examine the persistence of collective victimhood long 
after perpetrators and victims are deceased in people 
who have not even had direct contact with them. Thus, it 
is a strong test of the persistence of a sense of collective 
victimhood across time. At a broader level, addressing 
this issue allows us to contribute to a core debate in 
memory studies (cf. Ricoeur, 2004): What is the relation 
between history and memory, that is, between the actual 
events that took place in the past and contemporary 
representations of these events? 
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In this paper, we focus on an objective indicator of 
victimization: the number of fatalities per country. 
While victimization can take many forms, loss of lives 
is certainly one of the most severe and uncontroversial, 
especially in the context of an armed conflict. With 
respect to WWI, the number of fatalities per country, 
although still subject to debate, can be established with a 
satisfying degree of accuracy (e.g., Audoin-Rouzeau & 
Becker, 2000; Overmans, 2004). These rates constitute 
an objective indicator of victimization at the societal 
level and vary widely between European countries. 
Casualty rates constitute one of the indicators that can 
be considered at several levels of analysis. While at the 
societal level, loss of lives is assessed in terms of death 
toll by countries, at an individual level, the loss of lives 
can be appraised by variables such as the presence of a 
victim of the conflict in the descendant's family. In line 
with this reasoning, we shall examine whether these two 
variables—the death toll by country (objective indicator 
of victimization at the societal level) and the presence of 
a victim of the conflict within the descendant's family 
(objective indicator of victimization at the individual 
level)—predict, across a century, a sense of collective 
victimhood specific to the First World War. 
Over and above these "objective" variables, we seek 
to examine psychological predictors of sense of collec-
tive victimhood as well, and we focus especially on na-
tional identification: Indeed, a sense of collective 
victimhood is presumed on self-categorization within 
the in-group. Consistent with this view, past research 
has identified a positive association between group 
identification and perceived group victimization (e.g., 
Rime et al., 2015). 
This leads us to formulate the following hypotheses: 
1. The level of WWI-related sense of collective victim- 
hood should be predicted positively by the casualty 
rate at the country level (1a) and by the presence of 
family members involved in the war (1b). 
2. The level of national identification should predict 
sense of collective victimhood positively. 
We now turn to the impact of this sense of collective 
victimhood on two critical outcomes: the acknowledg-
ment of suffering inflicted on out-groups and the 
endorsement of pacifist attitudes. 
Acknowledgment of Inflicted Suffering 
Collective victimization is often only one face of the 
coin in many armed conflicts. In the case of WWI, 
nations were not only victims of war, they were also 
agents of war, victimizers. Acknowledgment of the 
victimization inflicted on other groups can be crucial to 
the establishment of harmonious relations after a violent 
conflict (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 
2008; Vollhardt, Mazur, & Lemahieu, 2014): Indeed, 
victims of mass violence want their suffering to be 
acknowledged by relevant out-groups, in particular by 
the perpetrators. This is often necessary for 
reconciliation 
(see Barkan, 2000; Brooks, 1999; Lind, 2008) and may 
actually manifest the group's, or nation's, willingness to 
engage in more peaceful relations (Cehajic-Clancy, 
Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011;Rosoux, 
2004). Hence, addressing the predictors of such ac-
knowledgment is far from a trivial question. In the pres-
ent case, as in many, groups are both victims and 
perpetrators. Which relation can we expect between 
collective victimhood and acknowledgment of inflicted 
suffering? 
While acknowledgment of ingroup responsibility for 
having inflicted harm on other groups is an antecedent 
of collective guilt (cf. Branscombe & Doosje, 2004 for 
an overview), it is not equivalent to this sentiment. 
Indeed, while people may acknowledge that their group 
has harmed another group, they may not necessarily 
view these actions as illegitimate, accept moral 
responsibility for these actions (if they construe them as 
wrongdoings) and experience the resulting feeling of 
collective guilt (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). 
Victimhood presupposes a clear distinction between 
"perpetrators" and "victims". While being labelled a per-
petrator may be threatening to social identity (e.g., Doosje, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Klein, [Q2] 
Licata, & Pierucci, 2011), the victim status is more am-
biguous. On the one hand, being a victimized in-group may 
induce shame or humiliation (Rice & Benson, 2005; Volkan, 
2001, cited by Vollhardt, 2010). On the other hand, in the 
context of a comparison with the perpetrators, the victim has 
the moral high ground (Baumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 
1998)—which may partially explain why many groups seek 
recognition of their victim status (Chaumont, 1997; 
Todorov, 1995). 
This leads us to the following additional hypotheses: 
3. If an opposition between perpetrator and victim 
status is firmly entrenched in Europeans' minds, the 
acknowledgment of suffering inflicted on other 
groups should be a negative function of collective 
victimhood. 
4. Contemporary Europeans should be more likely to 
acknowledge the harm inflicted on other groups to 
the extent that they weakly identify with their na-
tional group (because this harm threatens their social 
identity: Doosje et al., 1998) 
Hypothesis 3 is based on the assumption that the sa-
lience of the opposition between victim and perpetrator 
status is a function of the symbolic benefits that victim 
status accrues to people's social identity. If this is the 
case, people who strongly identify with their group 
should be more sensitive to these benefits and therefore 
be more likely to consider victim and perpetrator status 
as distinct and non-overlapping categories. Hence: 
5. The negative relation between victimhood and 
acknowledgment of suffering inflicted on other 
groups postulated under Hyp. 3 should be stronger 
among people who identify strongly with their 
group. 
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Effects of Collective Victimhood on Pacifism 
While few studies have considered the antecedents of 
the sense of collective victimhood, a significant amount 
of research has sought to investigate its effects, adopting 
mainly the "meso" level (i.e., intergroup) of analysis in 
Vollhardt's terminology. In this vein, Bar-Tal and col-
leagues have shown that victimizing beliefs can influ-
ence almost all aspects of the lives of the members of a 
society (see Bar-Tal et al., 2009 for a review). The sense 
of collective victimhood can have consequences at many 
levels. As such, it can affect the way group members see 
the world (e.g., Bieber, 2002; Noor et al., 2012; Schori-
Eyal, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2014), process the in-
formation (e.g., Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Levene, 
1999, cited by Vollhardt, 2012) and their emotions (e.g., 
Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Drori, 2008; 
Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, & Fischer, 2007; Staub, 
2006) . 
But, to date, most studies on this topic have focused 
on the harmful effects of collective victimhood on inter-
group relations (Vollhardt, 2010). Past victimization 
during an intergroup conflict was shown, among other 
things, to be related to a reduced willingness to ac-
knowledge the responsibility of the ingroup for atroci-
ties committed during a conflict (Cehajic, Brown, & 
Gonzalez, 2009) and a reduction of collective guilt when 
harmful acts are committed by members of the ingroup 
during a conflict (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Even 
though a majority of studies have highlighted the nega-
tive consequences of collective victimhood, it can also 
exert positive effects on intergroup relations (cf. Klar, 
Schori-Eyal, & Klar, 2013). For example, members of 
historically victimized groups may experience a high 
obligation to help members from other victimized 
groups (Warner, Wohl, & Branscombe, 2014) ora strong 
reluctance to inflict harm on out-groups (Klar et al., 
2013). 
Finally, as we have already noted, victimization can 
be experienced at an individual level—when one has 
been directly affected by war, or in the case of WWI, 
when one's relatives or ancestors have been affected, or 
at a collective level. The effect of these two types of 
victimization can be distinct. In a large-scale study con-
ducted in 14 countries recently torn by civil war, 
Elcheroth (2006) showed that communities with a large 
number of victims of civil war tend to be more 
favourable to humanitarian norms. This finding is 
explained by the existence of social representations 
associated with the shared threat of anomie (Durkheim, 
1897/1987), that is deregulation and disintegration that 
may afflict societies after such a conflict. The 
prevention of anomie after a violent conflict can only be 
achieved by the implementation of shared standards that 
protect the community, including humanitarian law. 
Thus, at the collective level, victimization predicted 
endorsement of humanitarian law. Conversely, it 
appears that, at the individual level, victims of a war 
episode were less in favour of a legal conception of 
humanitarian norms than non-victimized individuals 
(Elcheroth, 2006). Building on just world theory 
(Lerner, 1998), Elcheroth 
suggests that victims of war may fear being singled out 
as victims (because "bad things happen to bad people") 
and may as a consequence be unfavourable to judicial 
responses that will officialise their status. Using multi-
level analyses, this study found contrasting effects of 
victimhood on endorsement of lawful means ensuring a 
peaceful coexistence depending on whether it was 
measured at the individual or at the community level. 
Pursuing this approach, we consider the consequences 
of collective victimization on a specific attitude: 
pacifism. Strangely, to our knowledge, research on col-
lective victimhood, which typically focuses on war con-
texts, has failed to consider the impact of this experience 
on attitudes towards war and peace. Conversely, research 
on attitudes towards war and peace has also failed to 
investigate the impact of victimhood (for an overview, 
see Cohrs & O'Dwyer, in press). Knowing if and when 
collective victimhood fuels positive attitudes towards 
peace is a question of both major theoretical and 
practical interest. 
The choice of this variable is also motivated by the 
strong association between World War I and the devel-
opment of a pacifist movement, especially in Europe (for 
an historical overview, see. Prost & Winter, 2004). But 
can perceived victimization experienced in a distinct past 
still influence the pacifism of young adults from 
European countries hundred years later? And if so, in 
which direction? Elcheroth's findings indicate that vic-
timization experienced at the societal level leads to more 
favourable attitudes toward humanitarian norms, while 
victimization experienced at the individual level has an 
opposite effect and may contribute to renewing the cycle 
of violence. Naturally, however, the vast difference 
between the contexts studied by Elcheroth and WWI 
may not warrant a direct transposition of these results. 
Yet there are reasons to believe his hypotheses may 
inform the present context as well. 
During and after WW1, pacifism was a vast social 
movement whose views became part of official dis-
course, especially in Western European countries (Brock 
& Young, 1999; Prost & Winter, 2004). From this 
perspective, we expect that, if it is still influential today, 
the death toll per country should influence pacifist 
attitudes at a macro level. If we attempt to transpose 
Elcheroth's analysis to the European context, group-level 
victimhood may have fostered institutions, values and 
social representations that aim at preserving peaceful 
coexistence between European countries. 
At the individual level, by contrast, earlier research 
(Elcheroth, 2006) suggests that victimization is unlikely 
to foster positive attitudes towards out-groups. On the 
contrary, it leads to a perception of threat (Staub & Bar-
Tal, 2003) and may also encourage retaliation towards 
the perpetrators of victimization (McCullough, Kurzban, 
& Tabak, 2013). This should result in less pacifist 
attitudes. Research on the individual consequences of 
victimization has generally focused on first-hand 
victims. The present research extends this past work by 
examining whether vicarious experiences of 
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victimization, experienced by family members, may ex-
ert the same effect over a 100-year period. 
Finally, we address the possible impact on pacifism of 
our two psychological indicators: sense of collective 
victimhood and acknowledgment of inflicted suffering. 
We have suggested that acknowledging the suffering 
inflicted on other countries may be driven by a commit-
ment to peaceful coexistence with other groups (i.e., 
"reconciliation"). If this is the case, acknowledgment of 
the suffering inflicted on other groups should be posi-
tively associated with pacifism. 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
6. Levels of Pacifism should be higher in countries that 
experienced many fatalities during the war. 
7. Levels of Pacifism should be lower among people 
who were affected by the war through their family 
members. 
8. A subjective sense of WWI-related collective victim- 
hood should be associated with less pacifist attitudes. 
9. Acknowledgment of the suffering inflicted on other 
countries should predict more pacifist attitudes. 
Method 
We tested our hypotheses in the context of a large inter-
disciplinary online survey involving social psychologists 
and historians (only parts of this survey are reported 
here but the full questionnaire is available here: osf.io/ 
3dkvb). The survey took the form of an online question-
naire and was conducted among university students in 
social science, between March 2014 and July 2015. 
Social science students (mostly in psychology) from 
21 countries answered the questionnaire, which was 
presented to them in their language of education. Only 
15 non-neutral countries from which reliable informa-
tion on losses in the First World War were available 
were considered in our analyses: Austria, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The sample 
consisted of 2423 participants (52% women) whose av-
erage age was 23.10years (SD = 7.64). The main 
European belligerents of that time were represented. 
Completing the full questionnaire took an average of 30 
min. Besides a section dedicated to demographic 
information, it was composed of several items/scales 
(see Table 1). T1 
Sense of historical collective victimhood. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no validated scale of the 
sense of historical collective victimhood per se. Existing 
scales address specific aspects of victimhood, such as 
competitive victimhood (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 
2008) or inclusive/exclusive victimhood (Vollhardt, 
2010). In light of that fact, the indicator of historical 
collective victimhood we used consists in an item 
adapted from a previous study by Rime et al. (2015): 
"During the First World War, my country suffered from 
the behaviour of the enemy countries". All variables 
were measured on 7-point scales, ranging from 1 (= 
"Not at all") to 7 (= "Very strongly"), unless otherwise 
specified. 
Inflicted sufferings to enemy countries. The 
acknowledgment of inflicted suffering was appraised 
using the following item: "During the First World War, 
enemy countries suffered from the behaviour of my 
country". 
Family involvement. The objective indicator of 
victimization at the individual level was measured by 
asking participants if any member of their family had 
fought or died during the First World War. Participants 
could answer "yes", "no" or "I do not know". Although 
fighting a war does not entail victimization, there is a 
Table 1. Sample characteristics, status during the war, death toll during WWI and WWII, historical collective victimhood, sufferings inflicted, identification to country 
and pacifism 
Country N 
% 
women Status during war Death toll WWI Death toll WWII 
Hist. 
vict. 
Inflict. 
suff 
Country 
ident. 
Pacifism 
Austria 126 68.3 C 51 57 5.26 5.47 3.65 5.73 
Belgium 
281 65.1 E 13.4 10.5 5.59 3.59 3.79 5.27 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 189 73.5 C 
100 41.8 6.09 3.19 3.97 5.70 
Finland 
180 52.2 E 9 26.2 3.94 1.99 3.85 5.41 
France 99 78.8 E 42.9 13.5 5.29 5.05 3.58 5.38 
Germany 134 30.6 C 33.9 79 4.90 5.51 4.08 5.01 
Greece 
200 77.5 E 32.3 70.2 4.57 3.37 3.56 5.33 
Hungary 
161 52.8 C 31 63.5 5.76 4.54 3.84 5.27 
Italy 137 81.8 E 29.6 10.3 4.86 4.50 3.11 5.63 
Portugal 
81 58.0 E 14.9 0 4.85 2.78 4.23 5.69 
Romania 146 76.0 E 77.7 40.1 5.36 3.24 4.22 5.52 
Russia 116 80.2 E 16.2 127 5.20 4.46 4.02 5.08 
Serbia 313 57.2 E 166.7 / 5.71 2.36 3.38 5.57 
Turkey 74 75.7 C 132.6 0 5.15 3.41 3.29 5.64 
United Kingdom 63 31.7 E 17.9 9.4 4.67 4.71 4.44 4.82 
Note. N = sample size; E = entente; C = central powers; death toll WWI = losses for 1000 citizens during WWI; death toll WWII = losses for 1000 citizens during 
WWII; hist. vict. = historical collective victimhood; inflict. suff = infl icted sufferings to enemy countries; country ident. = identification to the country. 
European Journal of Social Psychology 00 (2016) 00-00 Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
A century of victimhood P. Bouchat etal. 
large consensus that, for most soldiers, the experience of 
fighting in the First World War was immensely chal-
lenging and was often a traumatic experience (Abbott, 
2005; Audoin-Rouzeau & Becker, 2000;Gallagher, 
2015). We also know that the experience of former sol-
diers, even if they were not wounded or killed, took a 
great toll on their family and their entourage (Cabanes & 
Piketty, 2009; Davoine & Gaudilliere, 2004). Hence, 
although it does not distinguish between "fighting" and 
"dying", this variable can be considered as an indicator 
of family-level victimization. Participants may answer 
"yes" based on the assumption that someone in their 
extended family was affected by the war but without 
having any specific knowledge or memory. We 
addressed this concern by including an extra question 
aimed at assessing the source of their knowledge. The 
participants who answered "yes" to the question about 
family victimization were then asked to report the 
source of this information.
1 
Societal-level experience of victimization. The 
societal-level indicator of victimization was measured 
using the loss rate per 1000 citizens for each country. 
These data were based on Prost (2014), Riedlmayer 
(1993) and the Wikipedia article on World War I Casu-
alties (.) as in the study of Paez etal. (2008). A similar 
indicator was developed for World War II (World War 
II Casualties, n.d.).
2 
Identification with the country. Identification with 
the country was measured using a modified version of 
the national identification scale by Roccas, Klar, and 
Liviatan (2006), comprising 15 items (e.g., "I love my 
country", "Compared to other countries, we are a very 
moral country"). Identification with the country was 
preferred to national identification in order to avoid non-
comparable answers in multinational countries. The 
original scale by Roccas et al. (2006) is composed of 
two subscales: "attachment" and "glorification". Given 
that the two subscales were highly intercorrelated (r 
=.69), we aggregated them (a = .88 to .95). 
Pacifism. The level of pacifism of the participants 
was assessed using the Attitudes Toward Peace and War 
Scale (APWS: Bizumic et al., 2013). Although the scale 
includes two sub-dimensions (i.e., attitudes toward 
peace & attitudes toward war), a principal component 
analysis showed that items loaded highly on a single 
factor and we therefore decided to treat the scale as 
unidimensional. This is quite common also for similar 
measures of attitudes toward war or militaristic attitudes 
(see, e.g., Cohrs & Nelson, 2012). APWS consists of 16 
items such as "Our country's first priority should be 
Participants were proposed to following answers: Grandfather, grand-
mother, parents, uncles, relatives, other (specify). 
2
Note that with respect to Turkey, we ran models including and not in 
cluding the casualties of the Armenian Genocide. This did not affect the 
outcome of the analyses involving this variable. The analyses reported here 
include these victims. 
world peace" and "There is no conceivable justification 
for war". This scale has a good internal consistency (a = 
.76 to .86 depending on the sample). 
Results 
Sense of Historical Collective Victimhood 
Mean scores ranged from 3.94 (SD =1.69) for the 
Finnish sample to 6.09 (SD =1.21) for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (see Table 1). With the exception of 
Finland, all samples scored higher than 4.6 on the scale, 
suggesting the presence of a pervasive perceived 
historical collective victim- hood. Further, 55.6% of the 
participants who stated having a victimized ancestor 
reported having learned it from one or several of their 
grandparents. As their grandparents were potentially in 
contact with the generation of the war, this additional 
information suggests that at least part of the students 
could have a specific knowledge or memory of their 
victimized ancestors. 
The effects of objective predictors on perceived 
collective victimhood were appraised by using 
multilevel regression analysis using maximum 
likelihood 
estimation. Multilevel analyses allow taking into account 
the effects of variables at different levels of analysis. 
They provide the opportunity to assess the effects of 
macro-level variables in addition to the more classically 
used individual-level ones (Pettigrew, 2006). Analyses 
were run using the lme4 package of the R software 
(Bates, Machler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) 
complemented by lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Borckhoff, & 
Christensen, 2015), another package that tests the sta-
tistical significance of lme4 models. 
For predictors that vary within countries, we included 
both a random slope and a random intercept in an initial 
model. Following the recommendation of Snijders and 
Bosker (1999), if the addition of the random slope did 
not improve the fit of the model at alpha = .05 (i.e., indi-
cating that slopes do not vary significantly as a function 
of the county), we selected a simpler model with fixed 
slopes. When random slopes are justified, we report it 
but we do not discuss within-country variations in the 
predictive power of a given level 1 predictor.
3
 Indeed, 
the focus of this paper lies in understanding whether 
such variables predict specific outcomes over and above 
national variations rather than in explaining idiosyncratic 
within-country effects. 
In addition, note that all continuous level 1 predictors 
were centred within each country prior to analyses. This 
is important for interpretation of the intercept and slope 
parameters in a multilevel analysis (Enders & Tofighi, 
2007) . Thanks to this strategy, the latter are not influ-
enced by between country variations in the parameter. 
Finally, note that cases with missing values were ex-
cluded list wise for each individual model being tested. 
Hence, the number of observations may differ across 
analyses. 
3
The values of these coefficients are reported in the Supporting Infor-
mation: osf.io/3dkvb. 
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Table 2. Effects of predictors of victimization on perceived collective victimhood: multilevel regression coefficients and model fit indicator 
Empty model Death toll Family  Identification 
B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Individual-level predictor Family 
member 
   
0.097*** 0.019 0.090*** 0.019 
Country identification      0.138*** 0.019 
Societal-level predictor Death toll 
WWI 
 
.208* 0.091 0.176* 0.080 0.187* 0.083 
Family mean    0.142* 0.065 0.148* 0.066 
Country identification mean 
Deviance (parameter) 8056 8052 
 
7987 
 0.037 
7929 
0.069 
Random effects Variance       
Country 0.27 0.19  1.14  0.14  
Residual 1.92 1.92  1.90  1.85  
Note: Bs are standard i zed regressi on coeffici ents. 
°p < 0.1; 
*p < 0.05; 
**p < 0.01; 
***p < 0.001. 
Results are reported in Table 2. The deviance param-
eter (see Table 2) indicates how a model fits with the 
data. The lower the deviance, the better the model fits. 
We first tested an "empty model" allowing victimiza-
tion to vary randomly across countries (left panel of 
Table 2). From this output, we computed the intraclass 
coefficient (.12). This indicated that 12% of the total 
variance in perceived collective victimhood related to 
WWI was because of the country and confirmed the rel-
evance of relying on a multilevel model. 
Next, we introduced the death toll related to WWI, 
which, in line with Hypothesis 1a reliably influenced 
perceived victimhood. The greater the death toll within a 
country, the greater the sense of WWI-victimization in 
that country. To interpret the unstandardized coefficient 
of .006, consider that an increase of 166 deaths per 1000 
inhabitants translated into an increase of one point in the 
judgement of historical victimhood.
4 
Next, we introduced the death toll related to WWII in 
the model as a supplementary fixed effect (after exclud-
ing countries that did not participate in World War II). 
Indeed, it is plausible that people's sense of 
victimization associated to WWI may have been 
confused with the victimization produced by WWII. The 
impact of the number of casualties during WWII on the 
sense of victimization associated with WWI proved 
nonsignificant (B = .001, SE =.004, t(1825) = .388, p 
=.704). We therefore ignored this variable from 
subsequent models. 
Third, we examined whether the status of the country 
during WWI (i.e., belonging to the Entente, i.e., "win-
ners" or the Central Powers, i.e., "losers") influenced 
victimization. As inclusion of this variable (dummy- 
coded) did not exert any effect (B = .30, S.E. = .248, 
t(2295) = 1.20, p = .249), we did not consider it in the 
subsequent models either. 
 
Fourth, to test Hypothesis 1b, we examined the role of 
the family level indicator of victimization. In order to do 
so, we coded this value as —0.5 if participants had no 
family member involved in the war, .5 if they had and 0 
if they responded that they did not know (Ns = 542, 782 
and 986 respectively). As with other level 1 predictors, 
we centred it within each country. We also included the 
mean of this variable at the country level as a predictor. 
It indeed allowed us to differentiate the "within-country" 
(level 1) effect of victimization from the "between 
country" (level 2) effect of victimization, which is also 
captured by the death toll. 
Including these variables showed the following: Peo-
ple who reported having had a family member involved 
in WWI perceived more WWI-related victimhood than 
those who did not (in line with Hypothesis 1b). We even 
witnessed a marginal effect at the country level as indi-
cated by the effect of the "Family mean" variable: 
Participants in countries whose members were more 
likely to report victims in their families tended to report 
greater victimhood even when controlling for the 
number of casualties and their individual level of family 
victimhood. 
After having considered the impact of objective vari-
ables on perceived victimhood, we turn to the impact of 
a psychological variable: Country Identification. Again, 
we entered both identification centred per country and 
mean identification in the model. The results of this 
analysis are presented in the right panel of Table 2. As 
can be seen, the effect of identification with the country 
on collective victimhood was strong (confirming 
Hypothesis 2) but it did not cancel the impact of the 
"objective" predictors. 
Predicting Acknowledgment of Inflicted 
Suffering 
4
Given that an increase of 1 casualty per 1000 corresponds to .006 point on 
the victimhood scale, 166 casualties per 1000 (i.e., 1/.006) corresponds to 1 
point. 
There was wide between-country variation regarding the 
suffering inflicted on neighbouring countries as 
indicated by an intra-class correlation of .31 (see the 
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Table 3. Effects of predictors of victimization on inflicted suffering to enemy countries: multilevel regression coefficients and model fit indicator 
 
Empty model Death toll and family 
Perceived coll. victimhood and 
identification 
Interaction 
 
B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Individual-level predictor 
       
Family member  -0.002 0.026 - - - - 
Perceived coll. victimhood    0.205*** 0.050 0.202** 0.052 
Country identification    -0.105*** 0.024 -0.118*** 0.017 
Perc. coll. vict. * country identification      -0.069*** 0.017 
Societal-level predictor        
Death toll WWI  0.020 0.122 - - - - 
Family mean  0.247* 0.104 0.175* 0.077 0.193* 0.083 
Perceived coll. victimhood mean    0.201* 0.082 0.193* 0.091 
Country identification mean    0.157* 0.065 0.116 0.071 
Deviance (parameter) 8758 8700  8483  8475  
Random effects Variance       
Country 1.12 0.97  1.13 ** 1.09  
Family member  0.16  - f -  
Perceived coll. victimhood    0.06  0.07  
Country identification    0.01  -  
Residual 2.63 
2.60  2.32  2.30  
Note: Bs are standardized regression coefficients. °p 
< 0.1. 
*p < 0.05. 
**p < 0.01. 
***p < 0.001. 
empty model in the left panel of Table 3). From a 
descriptive point of view (see Table 1), it is worth noting 
that Austria, Germany and France acknowledged the 
highest suffering inflicted, and Finland and Serbia the 
lowest. 
Next we entered indicators of victimization in the 
family as well as the death toll per country (second col-
umn of table 3). In this model, note that the slope for 
family level victimization varied randomly within 
county: a random slope was therefore included in addi-
tion to the intercept. However, only the mean level of 
family victimization at the country level had an effect on 
inflicted suffering: The greater the victimization, the 
greater the acknowledgment of inflicted suffering, 
contrary to Hypothesis 3. 
In the next model, we included the measure of sub-
jective WWI-related victimhood and national identifica-
tion at the within-country (i.e., centred) level and let their 
slopes vary randomly. However, we did not include the 
death toll per country and the centred family variable, as 
these variables did not exert any significant effect in the 
previous model. 
Again and contrary to Hypothesis 3, participants who 
considered that their country had been victimized were 
overall more likely to acknowledge that their country had 
inflicted suffering on other countries. This occurred both 
at the within-country and the between-country levels. 
Random slopes for inflicted suffering where included as 
well. 
Next, to test Hypothesis 4, we examined whether na-
tional identification influenced acknowledgment of 
inflicted suffering. Indeed, at the within-country level, 
identification predicted acknowledgment negatively. 
a 
f) 
 
/ 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 4. However, at level 2, the 
higher the mean level of identification within a country, the 
higher the acknowledgment of inflicted suffering. Figure 1 
depicts this relation by plotting the F1 residuals of the model 
(i.e., including all variables but level 2 national identification) 
as a function of national identification. 
Finally, to test Hypothesis 5, we examined, in a new 
model, whether national identification moderated the 
impact of experienced suffering (victimhood) on 
inflicted suffering. In order to do so, we fitted the previ-
ous model but included the product of national identifi-
cation and WWI-related victimization (within-group). 
 
Fig. 1: Relation between perceived collective victimhood and inflicted 
sufferings as a function of the level of country identification 
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Table 4. Effects of victimization variables on pacifism: multilevel regression coefficients and model fit indicator 
Empty model Death toll and family Inflicted suffering 
B SE B SE B SE 
Individual-level predictor 
     
Family member  -0.049* 0.020 -0.046* 0.020 
Inflicted suffering    0.097* 0.036 
Societal-level predictor      
Death toll WWI  0.166* 0.068 0.147* 0.067 
Family mean  -0.062 0.056 - - 
Inflicted suffering mean    -0.056 0.060 
Deviance (parameter) 6176 6130  6035  
Random effects Variance   >  
Country 
0.06 0.04  0.04  
Inflicted suffering    0.004  
Residual 0.84 0.84  0.81  
Note: Bs are standardized regression coefficients. 
°p < 0.1. 
*p < 0.05. 
**p < 0.01. 
***p < 0.001. 
Figure 1 represents the effect of victimhood on identifi-
cation at one SD below and above the within-country 
mean. Within each country, there was a stronger associ-
ation between perceived collective victimhood and 
inflicted victimhood among low than high identifiers. 
The direction of this interaction is consistent with Hy-
pothesis 5 but rather than being more negative among 
low identifiers, the relation between experienced and 
inflicted suffering is less positive in this group. 
Pacifism 
Now that we have considered how objective and subjec-
tive factors may influence the sense of collective victim- 
hood, we consider the role of these variables in pacifist 
attitudes. Again, we first fitted an empty model including 
only variations within countries. The intraclass correlation 
was .07, indicating that the within-country variance was 
much higher than the between-country variance. 
Nonetheless, we proceeded as previously by adding death 
toll per country as well as the family vic- T4 timization 
indicator. Results, displayed in Table 4, indicate that both 
societal-level and individual-level indicators of WWI-
related victimization are linked to pacifism. In line with 
Elcheroth's findings (2006) and Hypotheses 6 and 7, we 
found that our two indicators of victimization predict current 
pacifism in opposite ways as a function of the level of 
analysis (collective and individual). As can be seen in Table 
4, death toll by country was positively linked to pacifism 
(however marginally) whereas family victimization was 
negatively related to it. Note that the per-country mean for 
the family variable did not predict pacifism. We also fitted 
an augmented model including WWI status ("Entente" vs. 
"CentralPowers"). However, WWI status did not predict 
pacifism over and above the previous variables and was 
therefore not included in subsequent models (B = .17, SE 
=.13, p = .20). 
 
Next, we examined whether WWI-related victim- hood 
predicted pacifism when the family-level and country-
levels of victimhood were taken into account. The 
answer to this question was negative for both the within-
country effects and the between country effects (in both 
cases, t < .20). This was inconsistent with Hypothesis 8. 
Again, these predictors were omitted from ulterior 
models. 
Next, we considered whether the perception of ac-
knowledgment of suffering inflicted to other countries af-
fected pacifist attitudes. Again the effect of the mean 
level of perpetrated victimization was not significant but 
the within country effect was highly reliable, which was 
in line with Hypothesis 9: Participants who ac-
knowledged that their country had victimized other 
countries during WWI were more likely to endorse pac-
ifist attitudes than those who did not. Note that the slope 
of this variable varied across countries. 
Discussion 
Building on a large and diversified sample, the present 
study provides evidence that Europeans may still express 
a sense of collective victimhood associated with a 100-
year old event. Second, individual differences in the 
perception of WWI-related victimhood are a function of 
actual experiences of victimization. These experiences 
have independent impacts if they are appraised at the 
collective (national) or individual (family stories) level. 
The results suggest that people's sense of victimization is 
constrained by actual experiences of victimization 
affecting their family or their country. Obviously, 
embellishment and collective imagination may colour 
memories of victimization in distinct hues, often 
exaggerating, sometimes minimizing, the group's painful 
experiences. But our findings suggest that history, 
understood here as facts about the group's victimization, 
constrains memory. This influence of history on memory 
is well illustrated by the effect sizes of objective 
indicators of 
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victimization, that are often as large as the ones of sub-
jective indicators such as national identification and ac-
knowledgement of inflicted harm (see Tables 2-4). 
Among the factors that may define forms of victim- 
hood in people's representations, we highlighted national 
identification and found, indeed, that individuals with a 
high level of identification reported more victim- hood 
than those with a low level of identification. This is 
consistent with the assumption that collective victimiza-
tion is presumed on a sense of collective identity (cf. 
Vollhardt, 2012). It also suggests that people's social 
identity may influence collective victimhood over and 
above their group (or family's) actual experience. 
We also turned to the counterpart of victimhood, the 
acknowledgment of inflicted harm on others and found 
that, contrary to our expectations, it was positively 
related to a sense of victimization. Indeed, we presumed 
that the negative connotations associated with the 
perpetrator role would be incompatible with the more 
rewarding victim status. In the same vein, the active role 
of the perpetrator, a moral "agent" (cf. Gray & Wegner, 
2009) could have been viewed as incompatible with the 
passive role of the victim, a moral "patient".
5 
Nonetheless, familiarity with the representations of 
World War I in Europe may render this finding less 
surprising. Contrary to World War II, which is often 
remembered as featuring clear heroes (e.g., American 
liberators) and villains (e.g., Nazis), WWI has been 
remembered, especially since the 1970s, as a "slaughter-
house" in which all nations both experienced and 
inflicted victimization (Todman, 2014). In this respect, 
they were both moral agents and moral patients. Further, 
it is plausible that, when carving a moral narrative of 
WWI, people do not categorize agents and patients in 
national terms. For example, after WWI, a dominant 
narrative emerged in which the central opposition is 
class-based: A common thread in WWI memory is that 
the war was organized by the elites at the expense of the 
less privileged (Todman, 2014, see also Bouchat et al., 
2016). In this narrative, the disadvantaged social classes 
of all war mongering countries are the victims and the 
ruling classes the perpetrators. 
Our analysis suggests that social representations 
(Moscovici, 1961), in the form of narratives (Laszlo, 
2013), guide people's experiences of collective victim- 
hood. However, these representations are maintained 
insofar as they fulfil needs related to the preservation of 
a satisfactory social identity (cf. Licata, Klein, & Gely, 
2007). How can the acknowledgment of having perpe-
trated harm on out-groups play such a role? Although 
speculative, several explanations are plausible. First, it is 
possible that victimhood somehow mitigates the moral 
responsibility for harm perpetration, and may even 
justify it, following the well-known logic of conflict 
escalation (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). For example, 
members of the Entente ("winners" of the war) could 
justify the harm inflicted on the Central Powers 
("losers") 
5
We are indebted to Roger Giner-Sorolla for inspiring the use of the moral 
typecasting framework. 
by the aggression of Germany in August 1914. But, 
more fundamentally, lumping villains and victims 
together in the distant landscape of WWI may afford a 
form of moral superiority to the inhabitants of today's 
Europe, in which the past warring nations are now at 
peace. Extending Festinger's classical work on interper-
sonal social comparison, Albert (1977) proposed a tem-
poral comparison theory at an intra-individual level, that 
is, suggesting that individuals may seek to compare their 
current selves positively to their past selves. A narrative 
of collective redemption may play a similar role at a 
collective level: In this narrative, the current virtue of 
European countries can be contrasted with their past 
violence. Finally, acknowledging the harm done may in 
itself confer a sense of moral value (Brudholm, 
2008) . This is illustrated in the Belgian former Prime 
Minister's declaration suggesting that, by apologizing to 
the Rwandans for their responsibility in the Genocide, 
Belgians were among the most moral nations (see 
Rosoux, 2009, 2013). 
In addition, we find support for the assumption that 
national identification is associated to a mitigation of the 
harm done to other groups. More interestingly, we 
observe that national identification moderates the rela-
tion between victimhood and acknowledgment of harm 
done. This suggests that high identifiers are more likely 
to see an opposition between victims and perpetrators 
with the in-group cast in the more rewarding role of vic-
tim rather than perpetrator. Thus, associating victims and 
perpetrators in a morally complex account of the war 
seems mainly possible for those who have not a strong 
national identity. 
But when considering the country-level effects, we 
find that countries with the highest average level of 
identification in our sample are also those who are the 
most likely to acknowledge having inflicted suffering on 
others. Given the correlational nature of our findings, the 
direction of this relation is difficult to establish (e.g., 
having fought in WW1 may have contributed to greater 
national identification). But at the very least, this finding 
shows that, consistent with the "narrative perspective", 
acknowledging victimization of others in a relatively 
distant past can be compatible with a high level of 
identification. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that status as a "win-
ner" or "loser" had little effect on collective victimhood 
or pacifism. During the inter-war years, very different 
lessons were drawn on both sides of this dividing line. 
For example, Germany witnessed a period of 
"brutalisation" and increased support for armed conflict 
(Mosse, 1990) whereas pacifism gained the upper hand 
especially in France and Britain (Becker, 2004). World 
War II transformed these attitudes and fostered a strong 
pacifist current in Germany as well (Mosse, 1990). Both 
sides suffered immensely from the war and the dividing 
lines of WWI have probably been superseded now by 
other oppositions (e.g., between East and West) as 
history has unfolded. 
In line with Hypotheses 6 and 7 and supporting previ-
ous findings (Elcheroth, 2006), we observe distinct 
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effects of group level and individual level indicators of 
victimization on pacifist attitudes: Thus, nations with 
more casualties tended to endorse more pacifist attitudes 
than those with fewer casualties. By contrast, partici-
pants who claimed having family members involved in 
WWIwere less pacifist. In line with Elcheroth (2006), a 
tentative interpretation for these results would be that 
nations that faced many casualties, and a strong war- 
related trauma, are particularly likely to have developed 
social representations valuing a peaceful coexistence. 
Our findings may be explained by the collective trans-
mission of such representations across generations. But 
social representations operate at a societal level 
(Moscovici, 1961). At the family level, on the contrary, 
resentment against past enemies seems to remain pres-
ent, and to fuel a more positive attitude towards war. 
Thus, we witness a complex legacy of victimization that 
can generate both brutalisation (Mosse, 1990) and 
pacifism. Policymakers and activists who have tried to 
implement reconciliation policies have had to grapple 
with the resistance of victimized communities (cf. 
Rosoux, 2013). The present study, while not questioning 
the legitimacy of pacifism as a desirable outcome of 
such policies, suggests that endorsing such attitudes can 
only be a long-term goal. That the legacy of 
victimization on pacifism can withstand four or five 
generations is indeed one of the most remarkable 
findings of this study even if, admittedly, the influence 
of family-level indicators is now much smaller than that 
of group-level victimization (cf. Table 4). It shows that 
the wounds that afflicted families during WWI have 
penetrated Europe for generations and can still influence 
contemporary young Europeans' outlook on peace and 
war. 
Subjective experiences of victimhood did not predict 
pacifist attitudes (Hypothesis 8). The distinct lessons 
one can draw from victimization (e.g., peace or revenge) 
may have blurred the relationship between these two 
variables. By contrast, people who acknowledged the 
harm inflicted on other groups were also the most likely 
to express pacifist attitudes. This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 9 and highlights the existence of a "virtuous 
circle" between acknowledgment of harm done and 
reconciliation. The existence of this phenomenon has 
been previously highlighted by Cehajic- Clancy et al. 
(2011) who showed that acknowledgment of ingroup 
responsibility for out-group victimization was linked to 
an increased support for reparation policies to this out-
group. 
Limitations 
While the present research offers new insights on the 
consequences of victimization a hundred years later, it is 
not devoid of important limitations. The most obvious 
one is its cross-sectional nature. Naturally, among the 
correlations we have identified, other causal relation-
ships than those we have postulated are plausible. 
Especially, whereas we have considered national identi-
fication as a predictor of sense of collective victimhood, 
it may also be construed as an outcome of this feeling: 
Victimhood might be a building block in the construc-
tion of a national identity. In raising such a possibility, 
however, one should be cautious about levels of expla-
nation (cf. Klein, 2009). Thus, victimized groups may 
develop a stronger national identity across generations. 
This is not necessarily true at a specific point in time for 
clearly identifiable individuals. By contrast, there are 
strong reasons to expect that national identification 
should predict a sense of victimhood at an individual 
level—given that national identification is a precondition 
for this sentiment to emerge. 
A second limitation of the study resides in the compo-
sition of the sample on which our data were collected. It 
consisted of university students in social sciences 
(mainly psychology). The nature of the sources regard-
ing WWI to which they have access differentiates them 
from a less educated population and may play a role in 
the present findings. As in most cross-cultural/national 
studies, the focus was made on comparability between 
the samples rather than on representativeness. 
Third, the measures we used are often limited to a 
small number of items and sometimes only one. This is 
mainly because of the length of the questionnaire that 
addressed many aspects of the perception of WWI that 
are irrelevant to the focus of the present paper. 
Further, our family-level indicator of victimization is 
not immune to biases. First, recollections may not be ac-
curate. We took steps to enhance accuracy: Thus, partic-
ipants who explicitly reported that they did not know of 
a relative were clearly differentiated from those who 
reported having none. Second, we asked them to specify 
the source of their knowledge and most of them reported 
that they had obtained such information through their 
grandparents who, presumably, had more directly 
reliable information having generally been in contact 
with persons with first-hand knowledge of the war. 
Nonetheless, a potential problem with our approach lies 
in the possibility that a third variable explains the 
relation between our family indicator and the outcome. 
For example, people who view war as an acceptable way 
to resolve conflicts (i.e., who are low in pacifism) may 
seek to justify these attitudes by downplaying the extent 
of victimization their family experienced when such a 
solution was used in the past. Hence, the conclusions of 
this study would certainly be strengthened if we could 
find indicators of family level victimization that do not 
rely on self-report, for example such as historical 
archives. Obviously, such a study would be extremely 
difficult to conduct with a large international sample 
such as the present one. 
Second, the formulation of the question, which refers 
to a relative who "fought or died" leaves open the possi-
bility that a relative was involved in the war, as a soldier, 
without being victimized by it, or that a relative was a ci-
vilian who was victimized without dying in the conflict. 
The last possibility can be viewed as a weakness of our 
indicator. Indeed, the way it was designed did not allow 
us to appraise the experience of civilian suffering that 
did not result in death. Although this problem cannot be 
eschewed, it is important to note that the majority 
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of casualties of WW1 were military (Prost, 2014). We 
also note that fighting in WW1 was often a victimizing 
experience for soldiers and their family even in the 
absence of wound or death. Nonetheless, more sensitive 
scales would certainly be welcome. 
Conclusion 
In his classic work on the memory of World War 1 in 
Europe, Mosse (1990) wonders whether "the transcen-
dence of the war experience and death in war lead to 
(...) the domestication of modern war, its acceptance as 
a natural part of political and social life" (p. 11). The 
present study offers a partial answer to this question, as 
it suggests that the subjective experience of victimiza-
tion associated with an event that occurred long before 
the participants' lifetime is sensitive to "objective" indi-
cators of victimization at the personal and collective 
levels. It also evidences that this experience can be asso-
ciated with an acknowledgment of the group's responsi-
bility for the harm done to other countries. Further, we 
show that the experience of victimization predicts paci-
fist attitudes in opposite ways as a function of the level 
of analysis one considers. However, the impact of 
collective experiences of victimization, which are 
associated with more pacifist attitudes, seems to loom 
larger today than the family-level experiences of 
victimization, which drive more bellicose inclinations. 
Of the many lessons that revisiting the First World War 
can offer us, these are not the least valuable. 
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